Civil wars are often explained as the inevitable eruption of historical grievances. Sudan’s current war began under far more paradoxical circumstances. Rather than a rebellion against the state, the conflict erupted within the state itself—between two pillars of the same military establishment that once jointly governed Sudan’s political transition.
When fighting broke out in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti, many observers initially interpreted the confrontation as a power struggle over military integration. SAF leadership pushed for rapid incorporation of the RSF into a unified national army, while RSF leaders resisted a process that would dissolve their autonomy and political influence.
Yet this institutional dispute masked deeper structural tensions. Rival military economies, competing political ambitions, and unresolved questions about Sudan’s post-revolution governance—following the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir in 2019—had already eroded the foundations of Sudan’s fragile transition.
Three years later, the consequences are catastrophic. State authority has fractured, millions have been displaced, and Sudan’s war has evolved from a domestic power struggle into one of the Horn of Africa’s most consequential geopolitical crises.
But an additional dimension is now raising growing alarm among regional and international security analysts: the ideological transformation of elements within Sudan’s military landscape and its implications for regional stability.
The Ideological Dimension of Sudan’s Conflict
Recent international statements have highlighted these concerns. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently announced that the United States had designated elements linked to the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as “terrorist actors”, alleging that they had received support and training from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. According to Rubio, these networks were responsible for “mass executions” of civilians and would face sustained financial and diplomatic pressure from Washington.
Whether interpreted as a direct reflection of evolving realities on the ground or as part of broader geopolitical contestation, the statement underscores a growing international concern: that Sudan’s war could facilitate deeper ideological penetration of state military institutions.
This concern is not without historical precedent. For decades, Sudan’s political landscape has been shaped by close relationships between Islamist movements and segments of the military establishment. During the rule of Bashir, Islamist political networks exercised considerable influence across security institutions and state bureaucracies. The danger today lies in the possibility that prolonged war could revive and deepen these dynamics.
If parts of the SAF increasingly align themselves with ideological Islamist factions, Sudan could gradually transform from a conventional military conflict into a hybrid system in which state security institutions become intertwined with ideological militant networks.
Such a trajectory would have profound implications far beyond Sudan’s borders.
A Strategic Vacuum in the Heart of the Horn
The Horn of Africa functions as a tightly interconnected regional security complex. Instability in one state rarely remains confined within national borders; it tends to cascade outward through migration, economic disruption, and transnational armed movements. Sudan occupies a particularly strategic geographic position within this system. Bordering seven countries and connecting the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Red Sea basin, the country sits at the crossroads of several fragile geopolitical zones. The collapse of effective state authority in Sudan therefore creates multiple vectors of instability.
First is the proliferation of armed actors. The fragmentation of Sudan’s security apparatus risks transforming border regions into corridors for militia activity, arms trafficking, and illicit economic networks. Similar dynamics across the Sahel have already demonstrated how quickly such environments can fuel long-term insurgencies.
Second is the humanitarian spillover. Sudan’s war has generated one of the largest displacement crises in the world. Millions have fled to neighboring states including Egypt, Chad, Ethiopia, and South Sudan— where most countries already grappling with economic constraints and security pressures.
Third is the growing risk of extremist infiltration. History across the region illustrates how prolonged instability creates fertile ground for militant organizations. The rise of Al-Shabaab in Somalia demonstrated how fragile governance environments can enable extremist networks to consolidate territorial influence, recruit fighters, and establish financial channels.
Sudan’s war risks generating similar opportunities. Should ideological factions gain deeper influence within SAF structures, Sudan could evolve into a logistical and ideological corridor connecting militant actors across North Africa, the Sahel, and the Horn. For transnational extremist movements, such an environment would provide strategic depth, recruitment pathways, and new operational spaces.
In this sense, Sudan’s conflict increasingly resembles not merely a civil war but a potential catalyst for regional destabilization.
The Humanitarian Catastrophe
Beyond geopolitical implications, Sudan’s war has produced staggering human suffering. More than nine million people have been internally displaced, making Sudan the largest displacement crisis in the world. Millions more have fled across borders in search of safety. Food insecurity has reached alarming levels. Nearly 40 percent of Sudan’s population faces acute hunger as agricultural production collapses and markets disintegrate under the pressures of war.
Essential public services have largely collapsed. Hospitals have been destroyed or abandoned, water infrastructure has deteriorated, and civilian populations—particularly in Darfur and Kordofan—have endured widespread violence including ethnic targeting and gender-based atrocities.
The humanitarian catastrophe is therefore not merely a consequence of the war; it has become one of its defining characteristics.
Ethiopia’s Strategic Role
Amid this volatile regional environment, Ethiopia occupies a uniquely consequential position. As Sudan’s immediate eastern neighbor and one of the largest states in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia’s strategic interests are deeply intertwined with Sudan’s stability. A prolonged collapse of Sudanese state authority would generate direct security pressures along Ethiopia’s western frontier while simultaneously destabilizing broader regional dynamics.
Ethiopia has already absorbed significant humanitarian spillovers, hosting large numbers of Sudanese refugees despite its own security challenges. Yet Ethiopia’s role extends beyond humanitarian response.
Ethiopia has maintained communication channels with warring parties, positioning Addis Ababa as a potential diplomatic intermediary. Ethiopia also hosts the headquarters of the African Union, granting it unique influence within continental mediation frameworks.
Historically, Ethiopia has played a critical role in regional peacekeeping and conflict mediation. From supporting peace processes in neighboring states to contributing troops to international stabilization missions, Addis Ababa has long served as a diplomatic hub for African conflict resolution. This institutional experience could prove vital in addressing Sudan’s evolving crisis.
The Limits of Mediation
Regional organizations have attempted to intervene. Both the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have launched diplomatic initiatives aimed at halting the conflict and facilitating negotiations between rival military factions.
Despite these efforts, meaningful breakthroughs have remained elusive. The peace process has stalled primarily because the situation has grown increasingly complex and internal divisions have deepened. Furthermore, progress is hindered by a lingering belief among certain stakeholders that the conflict can be resolved on the battlefield rather than through a negotiated settlement.
External actors further complicate the mediation landscape. Gulf states, Egypt and other international powers have pursued parallel diplomatic initiatives, creating overlapping processes that often dilute the coherence of regional mediation frameworks.
Perhaps most fundamentally, many mediation initiatives continue to treat armed actors as the primary stakeholders in Sudan’s future. Yet Sudan’s 2019 revolution was driven not by military factions but by civilian movements—including resistance committees, professional associations, and political coalitions. Excluding these actors from negotiations risks reproducing a familiar pattern in Horn of Africa peace processes: elite bargains among armed leaders that produce temporary ceasefires but fail to establish durable political settlements.
Conclusion: Preventing a Regional Security Collapse
Sudan’s war is no longer simply a domestic political crisis. It now carries the potential to reshape the strategic landscape of the Horn of Africa. The fragmentation of state authority, the proliferation of armed actors, and the possibility of ideological militarization within Sudan’s security institutions together create conditions that extremist networks could exploit.
Warnings from international actors—including the recent statement by Marco Rubio—reflect growing concern about these dynamics. For the Horn of Africa, the stakes are profound.
A destabilized Sudan could transform into a long-term epicenter of insecurity linking the Sahel, the Red Sea, and the Horn. Preventing such a trajectory will require coordinated regional leadership, stronger intelligence cooperation, and diplomatic frameworks that prioritize inclusive political settlements rather than narrow military bargains.
In this context, Ethiopia’s role as a regional anchor becomes increasingly significant. Through humanitarian response, diplomatic engagement, and support for African-led mediation initiatives, Addis Ababa possesses both the institutional capacity and the strategic incentive to contribute to regional stabilization.
Yet no single state can secure the Horn of Africa alone. Without a recalibrated regional strategy—and sustained international support aligned with African-led diplomacy—Sudan risks evolving from a tragic civil war into a permanent generator of instability across one of Africa’s most strategically vital regions.
References
African Union. (2025, February 21). Joint statement by the AU High-Level Panel and the IGAD Special Envoy to Sudan. https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/joint-statement-by-the-au-high-level-panel-and-the-igad-special-envoy-to-sudan
Al Jazeera. (2025, November 28). RSF converts hospital in Sudan’s West Kordofan into military base. Al Jazeera.
Ghebreyesus, T. A. (2024). Sudan is facing a devastating humanitarian crisis—the world must do more to protect the population’s health. British Medical Journal.
Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC). (2025, December). Sudan acute food insecurity analysis
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA). (2023–2026).
UNHCR. (2025, December 19). Refugee response in Ethiopia at breaking point as aid resources dangerously low, putting 1.1 million lives at risk.
By Adonyas Eyob Kelel, IFA
Disclaimer:
The content disseminated by the Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA) – including, but not limited to, publications, public statements, events, media appearances, and digital communications – reflects the views of individual contributors and does not necessarily represent the official positions or policies of the Institute, its partners, or any affiliated governmental or non-governmental entities.
While the IFA endeavors to ensure the accuracy, integrity, and timeliness of the information presented, it makes no representations or warranties, express or implied, regarding the completeness, reliability, or suitability of such content for any purpose. The Institute expressly disclaims any liability for errors or omissions, as well as for any actions taken or decisions made based on the information provided.
The inclusion of external links, references, or third-party resources does not constitute an endorsement by the Institute. Additionally, engagement on social media platforms – including, but not limited to, likes, shares, retweets (RTs), or reposts – shall not be interpreted as an endorsement or validation of the views expressed therein.Readers and audiences are encouraged to exercise critical judgment and seek independent verification when interpreting or relying upon any information disseminated through publications and posts on the Institute’s platforms or representatives.
ዌብሳይት፡ https://addisreporter.com/
ኢሜል፡ info@addisreporter.com
ቴሌግራም፡ https://t.me/addisreporter2
X፡ https://x.com/amejuju?s=21
https://web.facebook.com/addisreporternews
ስልክ ቁጥር፡ +251116393393
